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Among advocates and critics alike, the mere mention of the acronym "BRAC" evokes vehement reactions on Capitol Hill, just as it does in the White House, the Pentagon and civilian locales near military installations. This paper will examine the unique evolution of the controversial, but essential, decision process behind military base closures.
In the book, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison proposes three models for analyzing the decision-making process: the rational actor, organizational behavior and government-bureaucratic politics.' A fourth model, that of psychology, is also instructive in that it considers the influence of uncertainty, ambition and values in decision-making dynamics.2 The evolution of the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process is a paragon of how rational, organizational, political and psychological factors are deeply embedded within public policy decisions. defense and domestic spending levels; decision accountability and implementation. The most recent legislation governing BRAC emerged from a struggle to achieve some semblance of rational, or at least credible, decision-making by constraining as many influences and stakeholders as possible.
As this paper will demonstrate, developing a rational base closure process --one isolated from organizational, political and psychological influences --remains elusive.
THE EVOLUTION OF BASE CLOSURES
Base closures are not a recent phenomenon. In the aftermath of World War 11, considered by historians to be the peak of U.S. base inventory, hundreds of small recruiting posts, training grounds and mobilization centers were closed. Roth drafted a bill that put the decision in the hands of an independent, bipartisan commission with far less motive for opportunism than either the executive or legislative branches. In passing the bill, Congress conceded that its political self-interests precluded it from making sound base closure decisions and thus opted to remove itself from the heart of the process. It sought the same from the executive branch. The bill, which became law in 1988, empowered the Commission on Base
Realignment and Closure to independently review and recommend installations for closure or realignment, thus making it the "rational actor" in the BRAC process. Congress also established a "DoD Base Closure Account" so the Pentagon could finance related short-term closure costs without having to lobby Congress for additional appropriations. Critics referred to the measure as an exercise in legislative self-denial, "an example of legislation by which Congress, in order to promote public policy that is good for the nation as a whole, voluntarily deprived itself of the ability to take credit for standing up for constituents.'"1 0 However, its success was two-fold: it created a 
POLITICAL PERMUTATIONS WITH THE 1990 ACT
The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 worked well in identifying over 300 military installations for closure or realignment. The key to the process was that once the DBCRC compiled its recommendations, neither the President nor Congress could make changes to the list. Both had to either approve or reject the recommendations as presented in total. A narrow approval timeframe (15 days for the President and 45 days for Congress) coupled with an "all or nothing" option left little room for political maneuvering. The process, and the psychology behind it, was designed to protect the President and Congress from making any changes. Thus, after vehement, theatrical rhetoric in opposition, the DBCRC recommendations were accepted as presented. In 1995, however, "the sticky fingerprints of politics" entered the process at several points. In doing so, the final round of BRAC was nearly jeopardized and the dynamics of support behind the base closure process suffered irrevocable damage.
The 1990 an official commission would not convene in time to achieve critical BRAC closure savings. 11
Working to diffuse concern over Stone's potential conflicts of interests, Senator Sam Nunn retorted, "u "Dole, White House Agree to Nominee to Panel," Congressional Quarterly, February 18, 1995, p. 36. going to Europe or Japan for that commission. We wouldn't be picking Americans."' 2 Nunn's comments foretold the reality of the 1995 BRAC round: even with an independent bipartisan commission, there is no such thing as a completely neutral process. Only days before DoD was to submit its closure and realignment recommendations to the DBCRC, the Senate confirmed seven
Commissioners --six which the White House originally submitted plus a replacement for Mr.
Stone.
Unlike the 1988 process that preceded it, the 1990 Act limited the DBCRC to a review role only, giving DoD sole responsibility to compile and present BRAC recommendations to the DBCRC based on a rational cost-benefit-risk analysis of the eight specific criteria (Figure 1 ).
Military value was given priority weighting, followed by return on investment, with tertiary consideration to cumulative economic and environmental impact on the local communities. The DBCRC had the authority to change any of DoD's recommendations if they "substantially deviated"
in their analysis of the eight criteria or the long-term force structure plan. Just as the 1990 Act hinted at an unprecedented rejection of the commission's recommendations, the DBCRC Chairman, former Democratic Senator Alan Dixon, urged him to put national interests above his own. 13 The President ultimately approved the closure list but only after a fist-pounding press conference in the Rose Garden where he denounced the BRAC decision as an "outrage. While the 1995 BRAC round will profoundly influence future base closures, BRAC commissions have served an important and unique purpose: they altered the dynamics of decisionmaking by subordinating "politics" to achieve "good government" decisions. 1 7 In doing so, they created a rational, political, organizational and psychological umbrella under which elected officials could produce decisions contradictory to their self-interests. Just as the Framers intended, the 16 Twight, p. 237. psychology of the "ballot box" drives ambition and policy outcomes among elected officials in both the executive and legislative branches. Independent commissions, on the other hand, personify the ideal that public policy decisions should be based on impartial consideration of the merits of an issue, and that an informed, rational, value-maximizing outcome should result. While the independent nature of the base closure commissions brought informed expertise to the decisionmaking process, it also increased the likelihood that objective decisions would result by reducing parochial and self-interests. Having said this, it is interesting to note that a 1997 study found decision outcomes of base closure commissions to be very similar to those of elected representatives. The study concluded that independent commissions do not necessarily change the pattern of political influence on the outcomes. Instead, their primary contribution is to allow outcomes to occur at all.18
The evolution of BRAC is indeed a paradox of how political, bureaucratic and psychological elements, when properly aligned, can produce a fairly rational process. Such an outcome can be elusive to achieve and is unlikely to continue once "the sticky fingerprints of politics get in there."
The evolution of the base closure process provides two important lessons to guide behavior in strategic decision-making: 1) in politics, as in life, what goes around comes around and 2) in politics, as in war, the result is never final.
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FIGURE 1
The following eight criteria were considered in reviewing military installations for closure or realignment under the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. Priority weighting of criteria was given first to military value, followed by return on investment, and then economic and environmental impact on base communities:
Military Value 1. Current and future mission requirements, and impact on operational readiness of DoD's total force 2. Availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both existing and potential receiving location(s)
3. Ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving location(s)
Cost and manpower implications
Return on Investment 5. Extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years (beginning with the date of completion of closure or realignment) for savings to exceed the costs to close Impact 6. Economic impact on communities 7. Ability of both existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel 8. Environmental impact (but not environmental cleanup costs)
